Behavioral economists, who emphasize the importance of other-regarding or social preferences, sometimes argue that their findings threaten traditional game theory. Binmore disputes both their interpretations of their findings and their claims about what game theorists think it reasonable to predict.
Binmore's findings from two decades of game theory experiments have made a lasting contribution to economics. These papers--some co-authored with other leading economists, including Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton--show that game theory does indeed work in favorable laboratory environments, even in the challenging case of bargaining.
The Bargaining Challenge , Volume 2. More details. Ken Binmore 31 books 51 followers. Author of 77 published papers and 11 books. Using ideas borrowed from the theory of bargaining and repeated games, Binmore is led instead to a form of egalitarianism that vindicates the intuitions that led Rawls to write his Theory of Justice.
Written for an interdisciplinary audience, Just Playing offers a panoramic tour through a range of new and disturbing insights that game theory brings to anthropology, biology, economics, philosophy, and psychology.
It is essential reading for anyone who thinks it likely that ethics evolved along with the human species. Binmore argues that game theory provides a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters. In Game Theory and the Social Contract , Ken Binmore argues that game theory provides a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters.
His reinterpretation of classical social contract ideas within a game-theoretic framework generates new insights into the fundamental questions of social philosophy. He clears the way for this ambitious endeavor by first focusing on foundational issues—paying particular attention to the failings of recent attempts to import game—theoretic ideas into social and political philosophy.
Binmore shows how ideas drawn from the classic expositions of Harsanyi and Rawls produce a synthesis that is consistent with the modern theory of noncooperative games. In the process, he notes logical weaknesses in other analyses of social cooperation and coordination, such as those offered by Rousseau, Kant, Gauthier, and Nozick.
He persuasively argues that much of the current literature elaborates a faulty analysis of an irrelevant game. Game Theory and the Social Contract makes game-theoretic ideas more widely accessible to those with only a limited knowledge of the field. Instructional material is woven into the narrative, which is illustrated with many simple examples, and the mathematical content has been reduced to a minimum.
These seventeen contributions take up the most recent research in game theory, reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field today. They are classified in five general tactical categories - prediction, explanation, investigation, description, and prescription - and wit in these along applied and theoretical divisions.
The introduction clearly lays out this framework. This text offers a systematic, rigorous, and unified presentation of evolutionary game theory, covering the core developments of the theory from its inception in biology in the s through recent advances.
Evolutionary game theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents, is used by economists to make predictions in settings where traditional assumptions about agents' rationality and knowledge may not be justified.
Recently, computer scientists, transportation scientists, engineers, and control theorists have also turned to evolutionary game theory, seeking tools for modeling dynamics in multiagent systems.
Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics provides a point of entry into the field for researchers and students in all of these disciplines. The text first considers population games, which provide a simple, powerful model for studying strategic interactions among large numbers of anonymous agents. It then studies the dynamics of behavior in these games. By introducing a general model of myopic strategy revision by individual agents, the text provides foundations for two distinct approaches to aggregate behavior dynamics: the deterministic approach, based on differential equations, and the stochastic approach, based on Markov processes.
Key results on local stability, global convergence, stochastic stability, and nonconvergence are developed in detail. Ten substantial appendixes present the mathematical tools needed to work in evolutionary game theory, offering a practical introduction to the methods of dynamic modeling.
Accompanying the text are more than color illustrations of the mathematics and theoretical results; many were created using the Dynamo software suite, which is freely available on the author's Web site. Readers are encouraged to use Dynamo to run quick numerical experiments and to create publishable figures for their own research.
Binmore's findings from two decades of game theory experiments have made a lasting contribution to economics. These papers—some co-authored with other leading economists, including Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton—show that game theory does indeed work in favorable laboratory environments, even in the challenging case of bargaining.
Binmore offers a recipe for making game theory work. He focuses on the most basic of its principles, about which many of the theory's critics are unaware, and captures their essence in observable terms, which theorists typically fail to do. Binmore develops the science of game theory by demonstrating that these fundamental principles are able to connect perplexing aspects of human behavior that can be captured by no other branch of science, and he does so through the implementation of laboratory methods that leave no question about how they operate.
Edward S. Does Game Theory Work? My answer is, 'Of course not, and why should it? William H. Search Search.
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